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Abstract—This paper presents an analysis of online dating
fraud’s geography. Working with real romance scammer dating
profiles collected from both proxied and direct connections,
we analyse geographic patterns in the targeting and distinct
characteristics of dating fraud from different countries, revealing
several strong markers indicative of particular national origins
having distinctive approaches to romance scamming. We augment
IP geolocation information with other evidence about the dating
profiles. By analysing the resource overlap between scam profiles,
we discover that up to 11% of profiles created from proxied
connections could be assigned a different national origin on
the basis of text or images shared with profiles from direct
connections. Our methods allow for improved understanding
of the origins of dating fraud, beyond only direct geolocation
of IP addresses, with patterns and resource sharing revealing
approximate location information which could be used to target
prevention campaigns.
I. INTRODUCTION
The online romance scam is one the most prevalent forms of
mass-marketing fraud in many Western countries. False dating
profiles are created by scammers as a prelude to a sustained
false romance, during which the target is repeatedly defrauded
of large sums of money. The impact on victims in terms of
both monetary loss and emotional harm can be substantial.
However, technical analysis of the methods used by these
scammers remains sparse, with few quantitative analyses of
attacks and attackers.
Previous work has explored victim understanding of the
scam process in interview settings [1], text reuse in romance
scammer approaches via Craigslist [2] and strategies deployed
in an anonymous Chinese dating site [3]. A major unaddressed
hurdle for combatting this fraud is understanding its true
global origins, as misrepresentation of location is common.
Uncertainty about location and international legal obstacles
can hinder investigation and prosecution.
The locations scammers give in their profile are typically
regarded as being as false as the profile picture, calculated to
attract the interest of their targets [1]. Dating sites record the
IP addresses used by scammers in creating and accessing their
profiles, and may compare those addresses to blacklists or use
the IP geolocation (especially when compared to the profile’s
declared location) to inform a judgement about the likelihood
that a profile is genuine. In response, most scam profile
authors make use of web proxies to disguise their IP address
connection information, and so they appear to be using a
connection from the location given in their profile information.
Dating sites are predictably countering by banning access to
their site via known web proxies and similarly allocated IP
blocks. There are however limitations to the effectiveness of
these countermeasures, with privately hosted or intentionally
disguised proxies escaping the checks of proxy listing services.
The real location, even at a national level, of the creators of
the scam profiles is of interest both to law enforcement and
for other preventative efforts – not only for the purpose of
identifying that a given profile is a scam, but for following up
with appropriate countermeasures once a significant origin of
scams has been identified (e.g., contacting local law enforce-
ment, funding targeted preventative campaigns). This paper is
the first study we know of to address this topic.
In this paper, we use a dataset of real online dating scam
profiles which includes profiles created via both proxied and
direct connections. We set out to answer the following research
questions:
• Where does dating fraud come from? What does IP
geolocation evidence tell us about the origins of profiles
created via direct connections, and how does this connect
to the locations given in the profiles?
• Do profile elements get reused internationally? Does
reuse suggest different origins for dating profiles? Can
we complement IP geolocation by examining profile
elements being reused between unproxied and proxied
connections?
• Does dating fraud from different regions present
different characteristics? Do countries tend towards
certain forms of romance scam in a distinctive manner?
In Section II below, we describe the available data, and note
its limitations. In Section III below, we outline the significant
origin countries within the SOURCE dataset, and the national
locations those profiles present. In Section IV we look at
text and images being shared between romance scam profiles,
and what these patterns suggest about the PROXY dataset.
In Section V, we examine the major scam origin nations
to identify patterns in other elements of the profiles, before
concluding in Section VI with a discussion of the policy
implications of this analysis.
II. DATA SOURCE
The data used in this paper comes from a public online
dating scamlist maintained at scamdigger.com, which offers
up romance scammer profile data for public awareness. An
exhaustive collection of the 5,402 scam profile instances, as
collected during March 2017, was examined with respect to
two sources of geographic information:
21) The location given in the scammer dating profile infor-
mation.
2) The IP address used to create the profile, as reported by
the dating site.
Other profile elements of note include the age, gender,
occupation, marital status and self-description, which are
analysed in detail in related work. Of the two sources of
geographic information, the former was recorded as a string,
often specifying location to a city level. This was geocoded
to lat/lon coordinates and a standard format through queries
to the Open Street Map’s Nominatim service1. For the sake
of brevity, the locations given in profiles are referred to as the
presented locations.
The IP address information was mapped to a location
through the use of a geolocation service 2, providing both coor-
dinates and structured address information. Some 368 records
contained no IP address information and were excluded,
leaving 5,194 profile instances. Of the IP addresses used,
many (67.9%) have been identified as known web proxies or
VPN end-points by the dating site, raising doubts about the
reliability of the inferred geographic location. For this purpose,
we separate the data into the SOURCE (i.e., un-proxied users)
and PROXY (i.e., proxied users) subsets, of 1,666 and 3,528
profiles respectively. It is possible that IP addresses from
the SOURCE dataset are in fact unknown proxies, perhaps
shared secretly amongst criminals, and similarly, it is possible
that PROXY users are only masking their specific connection
information rather than their national origins. We address these
possibilities below as they touch upon our results.
Some important limitations of the data source must
be acknowledged as context for our analysis. Firstly, the
scamdigger.com site is primarily a scam-list for profiles sub-
mitted to a particular dating site, datingnmore.com, which
reviews submitted profiles with particular focus on online
dating fraud, and lists those identified as scammers either at
registration or after interaction with members. The profiles
presented are thus those of scammers that attempt to target
this particular dating site, which may be a source of unknown
bias. As with almost all criminal data analysis, these are also
those dating fraud profiles from scammers who have been
identified or caught, and it is possible that they are not rep-
resentative of a more skillful subpopulation, which could also
be geographically biased. The former issue could be explored
further through comparison with statistics from other dating
sites, where they can be persuaded to release this information.
The latter is an inherent limitation of criminological data.
III. GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF DATING FRAUD
Table I lists the significant origin countries for the SOURCE
dataset. The largest single origin by far was Nigeria, at
over 30% of the dataset. West Africa in general accounts
for over 50% of the SOURCE locations. These proportions
closely match previous observations of the national origins
of advance-fee fraud, as determined by email header IP
addresses [4], [5], suggesting potential commonality between
1https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Nominatim (March 2017)
2http://freegeoip.net (September 2017)
these types of fraud. The next largest origins, Malaysia and
South Africa, are also well-known for producing other forms
of internet fraud. All of the listed nations score below 50
on the 2016 Corruption Perception Index [6], except for the
United States and the United Kingdom, suggesting these may
be unusual cases.
Nation Count Proportion
1 Nigeria 488 0.302
2 Ghana 216 0.134
3 Malaysia 178 0.110
4 South Africa 140 0.087
5 United Kingdom 86 0.053
6 United States 57 0.035
7 Turkey 50 0.031
8 India 47 0.029
9 Togo 41 0.025
10 Senegal 40 0.025
11 Philippines 29 0.018
12 Ukraine 28 0.017
13 Russia 24 0.015
14 Ivory Coast 23 0.014
15 Kenya 22 0.014
TABLE I: The SOURCE countries for > 20 scam profiles
Figure 1 plots the major scam origins against their profile’s
presented location, as directional arrows weighted by volume
of scams. The United States is the location most commonly
presented in dating profiles, at 63% of the SOURCE dataset,
followed by the UK (11%), Germany (3%) and Canada (2%).
As presented locations are usually indicative of the victims’
nationality, we can understand the data as reporting that
residents of the US are the major target of romance scams,
followed by those of other western nations.
Africa: Most African sources focus their attention on the
major western targets reported above. A notable exception
is a cluster of profiles from Ghana which appear to report
their location accurately. This may be a simple reaction to a
scam-detection methodology which uses mismatches between
presented and IP-geolocated locations3; or could represent a
more ‘honest’ scam format aimed at extracting funds through
straight seduction. A similar but smaller group appears in
South Africa. Other exceptions include a small cluster of pro-
files from South Africa and Ghana which present their location
as Iraq and Afghanistan. These are classic “military scam”
profiles, purporting to be members of the US military stationed
overseas. A small number of Nigerian profiles present their
location as Malaysia, for unclear reasons.
Europe: Almost all SOURCE profiles from the United King-
dom presented themselves as from the United States, with
only 9% targeting the United Kingdom itself, despite this also
being an internationally targeted location. Profiles originating
in Turkey targeted the United States and Germany, in keeping
with the international norm. Most interestingly, profiles from
the Ukraine and Russia almost always presented their national
location as consistent with their IP address. This marked devi-
ation from the pattern of romance scams originating elsewhere
highlights the distinctive nature of Russian and Ukrainian
dating fraud.
3Such a method is in use by the dating site operators
3Fig. 1: The major paths from SOURCE IP addresses to the locations given in profiles
Asia: India follows the international norm in presenting pro-
files as from the United States and United Kingdom, although
the ratio allocated to each is weighted more in favour of the
United Kingdom (2:1 vs the 10:1 in West Africa), perhaps
due to closer national ties. There are some small groups
of Indian source IPs which present profiles in Singapore or
Malaysia. Malaysian scammers also present profiles in the US
and UK at the Indian 2:1 ratio, with small secondary clusters
presenting from Malaysia and nearby Australia. Scammers in
the Philippines split their presentation between the Philippines
itself and the US, an unusual pattern that likely reflects the
close links between the US and the Philippines.
United States: Almost all SOURCE profiles from the United
States gave their location as within the United States. However,
the most common presented state locations were New York
and Texas, while the source addresses were mostly located in
Arizona, California and Virginia, suggesting a degree of lo-
cation misrepresentation within the nation or else imprecision
of unknown proxying attempts.
IV. AUGMENTING GEOLOCATION EVIDENCE
As previously highlighted, SOURCE IP addresses are not
necessarily accurate origins – they could be unknown proxies
which escaped detection. While this is inherently an unknown
factor, we can make use of certain additional evidence as an
augmentation. For SOURCE IP information we can assess the
likelihood of impersonations, and for the unknown PROXY
subset’s true locations we can examine the reuse of text and
images with direct connections.
A. Probabilistic Assessment
We can first estimate the likelihood of this possibility by
comparing the ratio of SOURCE and PROXY IPs for national
locations. It is known that proxy lists will have a certain degree
of error or incompleteness, which, under a base assumption
that knowledge of proxies is affected similarly despite their
location around the globe, means we are searching for an
unknown threshold at which to discard the idea that certain
origins are genuine – the rate of false negative error in these
proxy lists. As we cannot be certain of this rate, no hard
conclusions can be drawn from proxy ratios alone, but we
can say that a large SOURCE:PROXY ratio is a signal carrying
some information about the credibility of location information.
Where the number of profiles with an unknown IP address
is a small fraction of the number of known proxies for this
location, we will regard these locations as suspect. Where this
is not the case, we can be more confident that the IP address
accurately reflects the origin of the scam profile.
Nation PROXY SOURCE:PROXY
United States 1949 0.03
United Kingdom 204 0.42
Russia 47 0.50
Ukraine 23 1.17
Philippines 11 2.42
Turkey 10 4.55
India 5 7.83
Kenya 1 11.00
Ivory Coast 0 23.00
Malaysia 5 29.67
South Africa 3 35.00
Nigeria 12 37.54
Senegal 0 40.00
Togo 0 41.00
Ghana 4 43.20
TABLE II: Ratio of suspected source IPs to known proxies by
country
Table II presents this ratio for the major SOURCE countries.
From this, we can say that we have the most reason to be
suspicious of the validity of IP addresses situated in the United
States, with the observed count of scam IP addresses not
known to be proxies being a very small fraction of those from
known proxies. We also know that the majority of the SOURCE
4dataset from outside the US have presented their location
as being in the US, attesting international effort at exactly
this form of misinformation. Looking at temporal reporting
information, we find that the proportion of SOURCE profiles in
the US has been decreasing since 2013, suggestive of gradually
improving proxy detection.
The UK is the next most suspect IP location, also attracting
a large volume of SOURCE profiles as a falsely presented
location, and with more PROXY than SOURCE IP addresses.
However, scammers would have to be an order of magnitude
more effective at masking their IP addresses as UK locations
than as US locations, in order to explain the ratios of scam
profiles generated by these IP addresses. It is notable that
both SOURCE and PROXY profiles from UK IP addresses most
often present themselves as located in the US. This suggests
either that the UK supports a population of relatively security-
conscious romance scammers targeting the US, or is acting as a
significant staging ground for fraud from elsewhere directed at
the US. Temporal information here also suggests a downward
trend since a spike in 2014.
Russia and the Ukraine are also locations with a significant
number of PROXY profiles, but here there is less reason to
suspect the SOURCE IP addresses do not reflect the national
origin of the scam. Unlike the US and UK, we do not see any
significant number of other SOURCE profiles presenting Russia
and the Ukraine as their location, and unlike the SOURCE
profiles, most PROXY profiles from these locations present
their location as the US. The reporting figures appear stable
over the observed period. The few presented Russian and
Ukrainian PROXY profiles may simply be scammers protecting
their individual location and connection information, without
interest in masking their national origins. Similarly, known
proxies account for just over a quarter of the IP addresses
from the Philippines, but there are few profiles traced from
outside the country which purport to be located there, so there
is little reason to suspect large-scale misrepresentation.
The remaining locations are only lightly populated by IP
addresses from known proxies, and we may have confidence
that these are genuine national origins of online dating fraud.
Some locations show up neither as significant SOURCE
origins nor as presented locations in profiles, but only as
transit points in the PROXY dataset. These are locations with
significant proxy populations, but apparently of low appeal
as targets for international dating fraud. All such profiles
predominantly presented as located in the United States, with
the proxy country being at best a distant second. Notable
transit locations include the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden,
France, Australia, Romania and Finland.
B. Profile Description Reuse
Previous work has shown that romance scammers engage
in substantial reuse of certain profile elements to save on
labour, using certain cached images and making use of tex-
tual “scripts” which can be copied and pasted with minimal
editing [2]. We here seek to explore how these sharing
patterns appear geographically. Understanding which sources
are sharing resources can help identify cooperating criminals
and similar scam types. Geographic clusters of resources can
also be useful in identifying the true origins of profiles using
proxies to hide their location.
Text reuse is common in scam profiles, with key chunks of
text and expressions being observed across different unique
profiles. To identify these overlaps, we first preprocessed the
textual descriptions to standardise case and remove punctu-
ation, and then used a longest common substring method to
cluster texts. Any two texts which shared more than a threshold
of 10 tokens (words) were considered to be part of the same
cluster. By this method, 899 unique profiles could be assigned
to a cluster, sharing text with at least one other profile4
Location Assigned
Nigeria 88
Ghana 56
Malaysia 41
Italy 11
South Africa 8
India 5
United Kingdom 5
Benin 4
Kenya 4
Philippines 4
Other 15
TABLE III: Inferred true locations of PROXY profiles
Looking first of all at reuse within the SOURCE subset,
the greatest text reuse occurred within nations, with multiple
unique profiles originating in Nigeria and South Africa sharing
description text. The greatest international text reuse was
between Nigeria and South Africa, with multiple profiles in
each country sharing elements, and, interestingly, between
Nigeria and the United States. Given the previous evidence
that the SOURCE profiles in the United States may have been
created through undetected proxies, we can take these Nigerian
and South African scripts appearing in the US as further
evidence of this under-detection. Similarly, scripts appearing in
the United Kingdom suggest that there are undetected proxies
amongst the SOURCE IP addresses from the UK. Text reuse
within Africa and between Nigeria and to a lesser extent
with all of Malaysia, India and Turkey, suggest a common
approach to romance scamming in these nations. Notably, we
see little to no direct text reuse from Russia, the Ukraine
or the Philippines, either internally or externally, though it is
worth noting that we have relatively few examples from these
countries in comparison to the numbers from West Africa.
Turning to the PROXY dataset, we find that 241 (11%) share
text with SOURCE profiles, meaning that their true location can
be indirectly inferred. Table III reveals the results of assigning
the majority national label for shared clusters. As well as
adding significantly to the totals for the already-dominant
West African and Malaysian scam origins, this inference also
reveals a number of Italian scam profiles. Combining these
discovered origins with the smaller number of Italian SOURCE
profiles which enabled this inference, Italy would place 11th
in Table I, with more profiles originating here than in Russia
or the Ukraine.
4This number does not count variants of the same profile identified as such
from the dataset, so these 899 reflect 28% of the dataset
5(a) 2d...a8. (b) d4...9e. (c) 6c...89. (d) 15...bf.
Fig. 2: Images reused by scammers in different profiles. Each
sub-caption shows an excerpt of the hash of the image. Note
that although certain images are perceptually equal, their
hashes are different.
C. Profile Image Reuse
The use of images plays an important role in online
dating sites. Scammers often reuse profile images that
have been shown to attract vulnerable users in other lo-
cations. The military, the academic and the medical con-
text are recurrently exploited [1]. Figure 2 shows four ex-
amples of image reuse. These images appear in different
scammers’ profiles. While some images are perceptually
the same picture, their hashes are totally different. This
is the case, for instance, of Figure 2a and 2b, where
their hashes are 2da1883450f2b74357465d3031cfd2a8 and
d43c4519edc110c6a53dd10e40414e9e respectively.
In our work, we use perceptual hashing to fingerprint
images. This type of hashing extracts features from the images
so that two images will have the same perceptual hash when
features are similar. These hash functions can distinguish
between dissimilar images, while being robust against different
transformations and “attacks” [7]. For the purpose of this
paper, we leveraged different perceptual hashing algorithms in-
cluding the classic perceptual hash function—computed from
the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) between the different
frequency domains of the image—and wavelet hashing—
using the Discrete Wavelet Transformation (DWT) [8]. Per-
ceptual hashes within the dataset are compared in a pairwise
manner using their Hamming distance, and then tested for
equivalence based on a distance threshold, and manually
verified to exclude false positives. We observe a total of 187
images which are perceptually equivalent, with some being
reused across up to five different scam profiles.
Image clusters were then aggregated from perceptually
equivalent images which were connected by being presented
on the same profile page (our assumption being that these
are attempts to portray the same subject, even if perceptually
dissimilar in setting). There were a total of 183 profiles
connected by 57 image clusters. Within the SOURCE subset,
there were 45 profiles connected by 27 clusters of images.
Examining reuse within the SOURCE subset, images were
predominantly shared between profiles created within Nigeria
(14 internal connections to 4 external), Ghana (12 to 2), the
UK (5 internal) and South Africa (5 internal). The external
connections from Nigeria and Ghana were to Ghana, Nigeria,
Benin, Kenya and Turkey. Though the numbers here are
small, they fit with the more substantial body of text evidence
showing resource sharing largely appearing to happen within
nations in West Africa. These images might be copied from
other scammers, or profiles in our dataset could have been
created by the same scammer under an unresolved alias.
Turning to the PROXY subset, 19 image clusters in this data
were connected to the SOURCE subset, allowing a total of 48
proxied profiles (1% of the subset) to be connected to profiles
from unproxied connections. The major connected locations
were Nigeria (22), Ghana (13), Togo (5) and the UK (4),
with the majority of the PROXY profiles affected presenting
a US location. Again, this is congruent with other evidence
of a largely West African scammer population making use of
proxied connections to present themselves as US citizens, with
some hints of scammers also acting from within the UK.
V. CHARACTERISING GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES IN
SCAM PROFILES
A previous section has explored how the presented lo-
cation in a scam profile can differ according to the actual
location of its creator. Other profile elements may also vary
geographically, according to the particular flavours of romance
scam being employed in each location. In the section below,
we examine how demographic characteristics are distributed
according to the origin of scams from the SOURCE dataset.
We survey the demographic information—age, gender, oc-
cupation, ethnicity and marital status—for each major scam
origin country5 in the SOURCE dataset. Z-tests were performed
for the age, gender, and topmost category of occupation, eth-
nicity and marital status, compared to the SOURCE population
averages. Table IV presents the results, with statistically sig-
nificant differences (α = 0.05) highlighted in bold. Bonferroni
correction was applied to adjust for multiple comparisons.
Gender is presented as the proportion of males.
An immediate division can be drawn between countries
which predominantly present male profiles (e.g., Nigeria,
Malaysia, South Africa) and those which present mostly
female profiles (e.g., the Philippines, Ukraine, Senegal). The
age of scam profiles corresponds with their gender, with
female scam profiles typically averaging around the age of
30, and male profiles averaging towards 50. The rates by
which profiles declare themselves single also appear to be
gender-biased, with female profiles being far less likely to
use alternative statuses such as divorced or widowed. These
would seem to correspond to very different top-level strategies
of online dating fraud being pursued in different countries,
with, presumably, different targets in mind.
Within nations presenting mostly male profiles, the strate-
gies appear to be fairly similar. They all mostly report white
ethnicities, and most frequently use military or engineering
occupations. Two exceptions are India, where the all-male
scam profiles mostly present themselves as ‘businessmen’, and
Italy, where the profiles most commonly report professions
in the real estate sector. Marital status provides the most
interesting distinctions. It is clear that a heavy use of the
‘widow’ backstory is especially favoured by South African
and Turkish scammers, also most evident in the profiles with
5Those in Table I, plus Italy, which is promoted to importance when
considering text reuse evidence
6Nation (SOURCE IP) N Age Gender Occupation Ethnicity Marital Status
x¯ z x¯ z x x¯ z x x¯ z x x¯ z
Nigeria 488 42.61 0.95 0.73 4.13 military 0.19 1.54 white 0.60 -1.38 single 0.47 -1.73
Ghana 216 40.01 -2.81 0.46 -5.34 military 0.22 2.07 white 0.68 1.65 single 0.63 3.70
Malaysia 178 46.53 5.33 0.79 4.29 engineer 0.30 5.71 white 0.60 -0.86 single 0.46 -1.17
South Africa 140 48.61 6.95 0.81 4.35 engineer 0.22 2.15 white 0.77 3.57 widow 0.57 7.47
UK 86 46.15 3.38 0.93 5.64 military 0.33 4.09 white 0.66 0.71 divorce 0.33 5.51
USA 57 47.33 3.56 0.84 3.21 engineer 0.34 3.71 white 0.61 -0.20 widow 0.30 0.18
Turkey 50 46.08 2.53 0.72 1.21 military 0.26 1.82 white 0.86 3.48 widow 0.58 4.66
India 47 42.62 0.30 1.00 5.17 business 0.32 8.14 white 0.62 -0.14 single 0.53 0.39
Togo 41 39.44 -1.56 0.20 -5.89 military 0.37 3.52 white 0.39 -3.20 single 0.68 2.34
Senegal 40 33.98 -4.67 0.10 -7.07 student 0.57 11.23 black 0.38 7.75 single 0.88 4.81
Philippines 29 27.66 -7.07 0.03 -6.75 sales 0.50 14.85 mixed 0.48 7.81 single 0.97 5.14
Ukraine 28 29.15 -6.11 0.07 -6.23 academic 0.22 9.82 white 1.00 4.24 single 0.89 4.26
Russia 24 29.25 -5.72 0.08 -5.65 accounts 0.43 23.18 white 0.96 3.51 single 0.79 2.94
Ivory Coast 23 36.52 -2.44 0.30 -3.32 student 0.30 3.86 black 0.48 8.02 single 0.65 1.48
Kenya 22 35.73 -2.72 0.45 -1.79 self 0.32 3.28 white 0.55 -0.82 single 0.64 1.30
Italy 19 39.37 -1.09 0.89 2.33 realty 0.63 23.74 white 0.89 2.55 single 0.89 3.59
SOURCE 1666 42.13 - 0.64 - military 0.17 - white 0.63 - single 0.50 -
TABLE IV: Dominant demographic characteristics by origin country. Significant differences highlighted.
the (suspect) location in the USA. The UK features profiles
unusually willing to make use of a ‘divorced’ status. These
exceptions mark certain nations as following variant patterns
from the “Nigerian” approach. The commonalities between
countries could be attributed to larger-scale campaigns of
location disguise of the same individuals, or an international
criminal group or community following similar patterns of
activity, perhaps actively sharing tactics.
Nations presenting mostly female profiles have more
markedly distinct strategies. Profiles from Senegal and the
Ivory Coast are most likely to state a black ethnicity, and to
report being students. Profiles from Russia and the Ukraine are
almost universally white, but may be distinguishable by their
declared occupation, with accounting professions being partic-
ularly distinctive of Russian profiles. Profiles from Togo are
notable for including a number of females reporting military
occupation, whilst the Philippines often present distinctively
as mixed-race, working in sales positions.
Ghana presents an unusual picture, with a distinctive bias
towards a more mixed-gender approach to scamming. Further
examination reveals that Ghanaian profiles represent a mix
of two competing local approaches: male profiles following
the preferred pattern from nearby Nigeria, with dominantly
military occupations, whilst female profiles borrow from a
tradition more akin to that in Senegal and the Ivory Coast,
presenting mostly as students – though, interestingly, Ghanaian
female profiles are still more likely to be white than black.
Kenya also appears to represent a balanced gender mix of
scam profiles, but the comparatively small number of profiles
from there make it difficult to be confident about this pattern.
The language in profile descriptions also shows some re-
gional characteristics. To analyse the variety of topic categories
found in the profile descriptions, we used dictionary terms that
are mapped to categories from the LIWC 2015 dictionary [9].
Normalised category frequencies were recorded for each pro-
file description and grouped by country of origin.
As can be seen in Figure 3 our results showed that scammers
based in Russia referred considerably more to personal con-
cerns, such as work, leisure and especially religion, and that
Fig. 3: The variety of topic categories [9] found in scammers’
profile descriptions by origin country.
they tend to focus on their motives or drivers (e.g. affiliation,
status, power), while scammers from Togo, the Philippines,
the Ivory Coast and India used more words related to social
processes (e.g. references to friendship and the use of personal
pronouns such as “I”, “you”, “he”, “she”, “we”, “they”).
Interestingly, when analysing the number of references to cog-
nitive processes, such as tentative language use (e.g. “maybe”,
“perhaps”, etc.), discrepancies (e.g. “should”, “would”, etc.)
and cognitive words (e.g. “know”, “cause”, etc.) the highest
number of references was found among Ukrainian scammers.
Finally, Kenya, and to a lesser extent, Senegal, stood out for
7their language use linked to negative emotions, such as sadness
and affective processes (e.g. “cry”) and for displaying more
informal language forms (including ‘netspeak’ features).
It appears that there are certainly regional characteristics
of online dating fraud, which appear to be distinctive. Further
work will discuss whether demographic and linguistic features
such as these are robust enough to automatically identify the
origins of scam profiles.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have provided an overview of the geography of online
dating fraud, to the extent that our data source allows us to
explore this topic. While most online dating fraud profiles
present their location as a major location in the US or
other Western country, their origins are mostly West African,
Malaysian or South African, with Nigeria the largest single
contributor. These may be the most important targets for efforts
at preventing online dating fraud. Preventative and disruptive
efforts, working with regional agencies in these locations,
could have significant international impact.
Treating IP location information critically, we observe that
profiles which appear to have been created from the United
States can often share text or images with scam profiles being
created from elsewhere. Text reuse indicators can suggest true
locations for up to 11% of data coming from known proxies.
This is only an initial analysis, but refining and applying this
methodology using a database of known scam profiles could
help capture new scam profiles reusing observed elements.
Methods such as these, working from larger evidence-bases,
could help form a technological countermeasure to increasing
utilization of proxies amongst scammers, using the wider
criminal population to help identify and locate the more careful
elements.
At a national level, most countries producing romance scam
profiles tend toward creating mostly male or mostly female
profiles, suggestive of different cultures motivating the activity.
With a few exceptions, mostly-male-profile countries follow
a similar strategy with profile demographics, while mostly-
female-profile countries appear to have more distinctive trade-
mark approaches, which may be useful for investigators assess-
ing the likelihood of particular origins. Further work is needed
to determine how reliable presented characteristics alone can
be for determining the origins of a given profile.
While a certain number of fraudulent dating profiles are
seen to originate in the US, a number of other indicators
suggest that many of these profiles come from undetected
proxies for West African dating fraudsters, and the true rate
for dating fraud originating in the US may be much lower than
IP geolocation evidence alone would suggest.
The findings here might be taken up by law enforcement
and government to guide global efforts at disruption of this
particular crime. Whilst it comes as no surprise that these
crimes emanate from West Africa, according to our data, the
UK also have a share of fraudsters, and proxies across Europe
are being used as transit points to target victims in the US.
Law enforcement in Western countries, therefore, need to be
concerned with both the crimes that enter the country from
abroad and the criminals located within their own territory.
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